Key words sense of agency, intentional binding, action, free will, automaton
How do I know that I am the person who is moving?
Hon, Poh, and Soon (2013) studied explicit agency judgment under various amounts of cognitive load during a working memory task. It is hypothesized that sense of agency is affected on general consciouss cognitive capabilities because the authors found that working memory load had an effect on judgments of agency especially under greater working memory load in which the ratings of agency were to be found lower.
Sense of agency can be divided in implicit sense of agency and explicit Sense of agency (Moore, 2018). In explicit sense of agency the participant can directly report about it. An implicit measure is intentional Binding. intentional Binding is a temporal bias and its effect is perceived as an action generating an effect earlier in time (Rues, Thomaschke, and Kiesel, 2018).
The purpose of the study by Rues et al. (2018) was to investigate the visual action effects as compared to auditory action effects. It was found that the experienced time point of a visual action effect was more close to the causing action. In addition, it also depended on delay. Lastly, intentional binding in the auditory domain was stronger than in the visual domain.
Intentional binding does also appear in complex circumstances, such as an aircraft supervision task (Berberian, Sarrazin, Le Blaye, and Haggard, 2012). In this task, subjects had to track the move of their aircraft while on a predefined flight route and had to intervene when it was needed depending on the situation. The study revealed three important results. Firstly, there was found a strong relationship among aspects of intentional binding and the different amounts of system automation. Next, it was found that there was a gradually increment in temporal estimation with increasing amount of automation. Finally, the effect of automation amount on intentional binding was the result of the actual action-effect delays. According to these investigators, their results provide evidence that intentional binding is an implicit measure of sense of agency (Berberian et al., 2012).
One suggested marker of implivit sense of agency is called 'intentional binding', which is the propensity to see voluntary actions and their results as secured as time (Beck et al., 2017). Intentional binding was found to be responsive to the scene that was presented due to a difference among probabilistic and non-probabilistic blocks. Control was modulated by the outcomes of painful and nonpainful presented stimuli. Accordingly, the implicit sense of agency due to intentional binding mirrors the capability to have a choice among actions concerning different results and their consequences which presented an important association between volition, motivation, as well as responsibility (Beck et al. 2017).
It was investigated by Aarts and van den Bos (2011) if free will was related to self-agency. Human beings can be in goal-directed actions while being conscious and performing goal-directed actions in order to have an effect on action autcomes. The can also be in an unconscious state after being primed with action outcomes.
In their first experiment, Kawabe et al. (2013) created a situation where in perceptual grouping of stimuli among cross-modal trials was affected by sensory signals from an unrelated modality. The results showed that a detection in the delay among the beginnings of tactile and visual cues could be enhanced due to the presence of synchronized signals that were presented in a different modality that was not related to the particular task.
Wen, Yamashita, and Asama (2015) investigated how performance on a task with delayed events had an influence on one's sense of agency while ongoing action is related to a goal. participants performed better in the assisted condition.
The experiment by Oisi, Tanaka, and Watanabe (2018) is about wheter explicit feedback resulting from an action (whether succeeding or failing) did have an effect on sense of agency. It was found that sense of agency was reduced after a longer delay between a key press and a response. Sense of agency was higher in a succesful rather than an unsuccesful task. When during the task more obstacles were present it resulted in failed trails for sense of agency. According to the authors, goal-directed inference by giving feedback of the last outcome was associated with sense of agency. In this study participants did rate their sense of agency (Oisi et al., 2018).
Hearing and Kiesel (2015) investigated whether the sense of agency after an action altered after immediate or delayed effects.
Lynn, Muhle-Karbe, Aarts, and Brass (2014) investigated whether weakening the participants free will would be causally associated with sense of agency. Intentional binding was measured with time judgments after a tone. Explicit sense of agency was invistigated with the Sato task. Intentional binding was significantly attenuated in the anti free will condition. Beliefs do bias easy and implicit aspects that underlie our pre-reflective self-perceptions as intentional beings. In such instances in which integration of agency stimuli on judgment is transparent explicit processes may overrule implicit aspects.
Burin, Pyasik, Ronga, Cavallo, Salatino, and Pia (2017) studied agency and body ownership and if their triggered agency had the same temporal constraints to agency affected during actual movement. Either actual hand movement or illusory hand movement.
Participants underwent the Rubber Hand Illusion paradigm. Implicit and explicit measures of sense of agency were assesed with the movements that were made by their own hand, by a fake non-embodied hand, and by a fake embodied hand after some delay. Both implicit and explicit agency were found to be related to illusory ownership of the fake hand (Burin et al., 2017).
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